The title’s publication context
Burçin Çöl examines central bank independence by distinguishing goals from instruments and discussing its economic and political dimensions. The article helps show why independence is not a single undifferentiated label. Current legislation and the present position of institutions should not be inferred from this historical record.
Preserved issue document
Open the complete preserved PDF · PiVOLKA 09 — PDF, 20 pages, 1.91 MB.
Original Turkish document; this is not an English translation. Some historical fonts may not copy or search correctly. The historical text has not been updated as current scientific guidance.
University-mirror archive source
Document access restored: 16 October 2026. This is not the document’s original publication date.
Reading it today
Before repeating an old claim as a current fact, check its first source and publication date. Examine separately whether a historical example can be generalised to another population. The research-reading guide offers a starting point for notes on sources, methods and limitations.
Sources and provenance
Source check / web edition: 14 October 2026. Historical documents retain their own original dates.
Publication details and reading questions
Çöl, B. (2003). Merkez bankalarının bağımsızlığı. PiVOLKA, 2 (9), 5-6.
How does the power to set goals differ from the power to choose instruments? Would the same evidence establish legal and practical independence?